Trademark Exhaustion and the Internet of Resold Things by Liebesman, Yvette Joy
Saint Louis University School of Law 
Scholarship Commons 
All Faculty Scholarship 
2016 
Trademark Exhaustion and the Internet of Resold Things 
Yvette Joy Liebesman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
UNEDITED VERSION FOR INSTITUTIONAL REPOSITORY 
1 
 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXHAUSTION AND PARALLEL 
IMPORTS (IRENE CALBOLI & ED LEE EDS., 2016) 
 
CHAPTER 22 
 
TRADEMARK EXHAUSTION AND THE INTERNET OF RESOLD THINGS 
 
Yvette Joy Liebesman* and Benjamin Wilson** 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Over the past ten years, casual resellers have migrated from garage sales, swap meets, and 
classified ads to eBay and Craigslist, turning side hobbies into lucrative businesses. Today, 
30 million new ads are posted on Craigslist every month, and six million new listings are 
posted daily on eBay.1 The explosive online market has affected the sales of new goods, 
troubling manufacturers2 who seek to curtail the growth of this secondary market through 
several avenues—some legitimate, and others not so much. For example, to combat diversion 
to resellers outside of its official distribution chain, Tiffany, Inc., the well-known jeweler, 
attempted to institute a policy of limiting retail sales of identical items to lots of five or fewer, 
though this proved to be unsuccessful due to its sporadic enforcement.3  
 
Manufacturers have also tried to stifle the resale market by suing resellers and auction sites 
for trademark and copyright infringement,4 attempting wholesale removal of their goods on 
auction websites and other unauthorized distribution channels, and using auction site take-
down notice procedures that are supposed to be reserved for removing counterfeit and 
infringing goods.5 These actions go beyond trademark bullying and are more than merely 
  
*Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. This chapter is excerpted from an article 
originally published in the George Mason Law Review, The Mark of a Resold Good, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
157 (2012). 
**Associate at HeplerBroom LLC.  
1 reComparison Contributor, eBay vs. Craigslist, RECOMPARISON (2015), 
http://recomparison.com/comparisons/100646/ebay-vs-craigslist/; Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 
2d 463, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
2 Ellie Mercado, Note, As Long As “It” Is Not Counterfeit: Holding eBay Liable for Secondary Trademark 
Infringement in the Wake of LVMH and Tiffany Inc., 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 115, 116 (2010). 
3 See Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 473 (stating that “rights holders . . . have obvious economic incentives to cur-
tail the sale of . . . authentic goods on the Internet—after all, every sale . . . on eBay potentially represents a lost 
sales opportunity via [the manufacturer’s] own authorized distribution channels”). 
4 See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 96, 98 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010) (noting 
that “[r]educing or eliminating the sale of all second-hand Tiffany goods, including genuine Tiffany pieces, 
through eBay’s website would benefit Tiffany in at least one sense: [i]t would diminish the competition in the 
market for genuine Tiffany merchandise”).  
5 See generally Mary Kay, Inc. v. Weber, 601 F. Supp. 2d 632, 846 (N.D. Tex. 2009); Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d 
at 481.; Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 478. 
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stopping a merchant from using the owner’s mark—the goal is to remove the reseller’s goods 
from the market altogether. Courts have aided manufacturers by ignoring the lack of 
confusion as to a good’s source, and finding that online initial interest confusion as to 
sponsorship or affiliation of the distribution channel—even when the goods are the genuine 
goods of the mark owner—constitutes infringement.  Under a claim of initial interest 
confusion, a mark owner is arguing that there is trademark infringement because, even 
though the consumers’ confusion is “dispelled before an actual sale occurs,” the end result is 
that the defendant “impermissibly capitalizes on the [good will] associated with a mark . . . 
.”6 These courts’ reasoning is contradicted by strong evidence showing that many consumers 
visit sites like eBay and Craigslist to find genuine goods at lower costs than they would find 
buying directly from the mark owner or authorized retailer, and are therefore not confused as 
to affiliation regarding distribution channel.7 
 
Policies that advance the mark owner’s ability to control all distribution channels harm 
consumers and disincentivize competition; manufacturers would have less motivation to 
innovate and improve their product when they control all distribution of goods beyond their 
first sale.  Consumers would lose out on the competition that resellers provide.8  We argue for 
an end to spurious claims of confusion where genuine goods are sold outside the 
manufacturer’s distribution channel, as long as the reseller clearly disclaims any affiliation 
with the manufacturer or authorized distributor.  Our suggestions would protect the lawful 
sale of goods in the secondary market while allowing manufacturers to prevent counterfeit 
products from being sold online.  
 
 
II. That’s Gonna Leave a Mark 
 
When one buys a Waterford crystal vase, the Waterford mark remains associated with the 
vase. No matter how many times that vase changes ownership, it remains identified as a 
Waterford vase. This serves a trademark’s dual function of identifying the source of the vase 
and protecting the Waterford brand equity. “[T]rademark law protects the producer from 
pirates and counterfeiters” and others who would attempt to exploit the good will established 
by Waterford.9 However, merely because the Waterford mark remains inextricably linked to 
its vases as a source indicator does not permit Waterford to control downstream sales of its 
goods outside its own distribution chains.10 And while the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham 
  
6  Playboy Enters. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2004).  
7 See Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 577 (2005). Prof. 
Goldman also discusses how customer surveys and other data show a variety of reasons for the use of trademark 
search terms, including finding distribution sources other than those authorized by the mark owner, and that 
there no evidence of confusion based on use of search terms. See id. at 522, 565. 
8 See generally Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Owning Mark(et)s, 109 MICH. L. REV. 137, 187 (2010). 
9 See S. REP. NO. 100-515, at 4 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5580 (stating trademark dual 
purpose of protecting “the public by making consumers confident that they can identify brands they prefer and 
can purchase those brands without being confused or misled” and protecting the brand equity of mark owners, 
who spend “conside[r]able time and money bringing a product to the marketplace.”).   
10 Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). 
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Act) is intended to promote quality goods and services by protecting producers’ good will, it 
is irrelevant whether the customer even knows the identity of the source. Consumers do not 
need to know that Kimberly-Clark makes “Huggies” disposable diapers, so long as the 
consumer recognizes that the “Huggies” mark identifies a single source of the good. As long 
as the customer is not confused as to the source of these genuine goods, then it should be 
irrelevant whether it was sold through the mark owner’s own distribution channel or a 
reseller.11 
 
A. Genuine Goods 
 
The legislative history of the Lanham Act and related case law recognizes the need to protect 
consumers from passing off or otherwise confusing customers into purchasing goods that are 
not the genuine goods of the mark owner.12 Trademarks serve to (1) foster competition in the 
marketplace;13 (2) encourage manufacturers to maintain the quality of goods;14 (3) 
“discourage[] those who hope to sell inferior products by capitalizing on a consumer’s 
inability quickly to evaluate the quality of an item offered for sale;”15 (4) help consumers 
locate products and services more efficiently;16 and (5) serve as a “species of advertising.”17 
And while trademark protection may have some anticompetitive consequences, “such 
protection may nevertheless remain justified so long as the mark improves the flow of 
otherwise indiscernible information concerning . . . the product to consumers, and . . . 
consumer desires to producers.”18 
 
B. Harsh Realities 
 
Although it would appear that—based on nominative fair use and first sale/exhaustion 
principles—online secondary-sale merchants have a strong and valid affirmative defense 
against any claims of trademark infringement and should, thus, be free from interference by 
the mark owners, the reality of fighting these charges may be enough to shut down a 
secondary market business.  The Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and auction sites also may 
face accusations of contributory infringement should they refuse to remove listings for the 
  
11 Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 
(2d Cir. 1955); 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 3:7 (4th 
ed. 2012). 
12 Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985); S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946). 
13 S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 4 (“To protect trade-marks, therefore, is to protect the public from deceit, to foster 
fair competition, and to secure to the business community the advantages of reputation and good will by pre-
venting their diversion from those who have created them to those who have not.”). 
14 Park ’N Fly, 469 U.S. at 198. 
15 ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE LAW OF COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS 
AND TRADEMARKS, § 25.3, at 547 (2003) (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 
(1995)). 
16 See, e.g., Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 163-64. 
17 Northam Warren Corp. v. Universal Cosmetic Co., 18 F.2d 774, 774 (7th Cir. 1927). 
18 Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 431 (1999). 
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allegedly offending goods. Oftentimes, the small reseller cannot afford an attorney to defend 
itself.19  Reseller-defendants may face the same fate as Veoh Networks, which, even though it 
was cleared of copyright infringement liability, was fatally wounded defending itself. “Veoh 
is legal, but Veoh is dead—killed by rightsowner lawfare that bled it dry.”20  Likewise, 
resellers may be dead right, but dead nonetheless if they attempt to fight big plaintiffs who 
are more concerned with shutting down competition than proving infringement. 
 
 
III. Waging Lawfare 
 
In addition to using threatening cease-and-desist letters, mark owners have not been shy 
about pursuing their claims in court.21 The most common suits brought against online 
resellers are claims of either infringement, or false designation of origin or description 
regarding the reseller’s affiliation with the mark owner as an “authorized” distributor, often 
based on initial interest confusion.22 Other claims sometimes alleged include trademark 
dilution, tortious interference with business relations, copyright infringement, and false 
advertising.23  
 
A. Claiming All Sorts of Confusion 
 
In her prima facie case, a plaintiff mark owner suing for trademark infringement must 
demonstrate that (1) she is the owner of a registered mark; (2) the defendant has used a mark 
in commerce in connection with goods or services as an indicator of source or sponsorship; 
and (3) this use is likely to cause customer confusion.24 Of these elements, the last is the key 
in any infringement suit.25 Supposedly, “likelihood” is not the mere possibility of confusion; 
customer confusion must be “probable,” and the likelihood of confusion must affect an 
“appreciable or substantial number of consumers.”26 The eight factors adopted by the Second 
  
19 Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WISC. L. REV. 625, 647-48, 653; Ina Steiner, David 
Versus Goliath: eBay Sellers Take on Corporate America, ECOMMERCEBYTES (Aug. 5, 2003), 
http://www.ecommercebytes.com/cab/abn/y03/m08/i05/s02; Melvin Simensky & Eric C. Osterberg, The Insur-
ance and Management of Intellectual Property Risks, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321, 337 (1999). 
20 See Eric Goldman, UMG v. Shelter Capital: A Cautionary Tale of Rightsowner Overzealousness, 
TECH. & MKTG. LAW BLOG (Dec. 27, 2011), 
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/12/umg_v_shelter_c.htm. 
21 See William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 63-64 (2008). 
22 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (2006);§ 1125(a)(1); See also generally Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 
411 F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir. 1969). 
23 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1); see, e.g., Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 725, 733 
(9th Cir. 1999) (tortious interference); see Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 970 (10th Cir. 
2002) (false advertising). 
24 See, e.g., Dep’t of Parks & Recreation v. Bazaar del Mundo, Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2006). 
25 Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 877 (6th Cir. 2002). 
26 Rodeo Collection, Ltd. v. West Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 1987); Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. 
R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1978) (per curiam); SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 15, at § 29.1, 
638-40. 
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Circuit in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp. are typical of those used by other 
circuits.  Courts consider: (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) the degree of similarity 
between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s marks; (3) the proximity of the products or 
services covered by the marks; (4) the likelihood that the plaintiff will bridge the gap; (5) 
evidence of actual confusion of consumers; (6) the defendant’s good faith in adopting the 
mark; (7) the quality of the defendant’s product or service; and (8) consumer sophistication.27 
 
Resellers are usually accused of confusion as to affiliation or sponsorship—that is, the 
consumer is likely to think that the reseller is an authorized distributor or affiliated with the 
mark owner, even if, upon visiting the reseller’s website, the consumer immediately realizes 
this is not the case. 28  In their assertions, mark owners often compare this initial interest 
confusion to a “bait and switch”—the plaintiff claims that the defendant has used the 
plaintiff’s mark in a way that gains the consumers’ initial attention.29 Initial interest confusion 
relies on the notion that, due to being initially drawn to the competitor,  
 
[e]ven though the consumer eventually may realize that the product is not the one 
originally sought, he or she may stay with the competitor. In that way, the competitor 
has captured the trademark holder’s potential visitors or customers . . . . Even if the 
consumer eventually becomes aware of the source’s actual identity, or where no 
actual sale results, there is nonetheless damage to the trademark.30  
 
Initial interest confusion is a controversial claim and has not been accepted by all circuits. On 
the one hand, the Ninth Circuit recognizes “that the use of another’s trademark in a manner 
calculated ‘to capture initial consumer attention, even though no actual sale is finally 
completed as a result of the confusion, may be still an infringement.’”31 The Fourth Circuit, 
however, describes it as “relatively new and sporadically applied” and has refused to consider 
the doctrine as a legitimate claim under the Lanham Act.32  The First Circuit also rejects 
initial interest confusion.33 
 
The initial interest confusion doctrine “is at odds with the purpose, intent, and literal meaning 
of the Lanham Act”34 and we should question the outright validity of the doctrine. As 
  
27 Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); SCHECHTER & THOMAS, su-
pra note 15, § 29.1, at 640.   
28 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1); Designer Skin, LLC. v. S & L Vitamins, Inc., 560 F. Supp. 2d 811, 818 (D. Ariz. 
2008). 
29 See Vail Assocs., Inc. v. Vend-Tel-Co., 516 F.3d 853, 872 (10th Cir. 2008). For a synopsis of the case histo-
ry of initial interest confusion, see Jennifer E. Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads 
of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105, 114-21 (2005). 
30 Austl. Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1238-39 (10th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). 
31 Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp. 174 F.3d 1036, 1062 (9th Cir. 1999). 
32 Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 315-16 (4th Cir. 2005).  
 33  See N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 113 (D. Mass. 2000). 
34 Lisa M. Sharrock, Realigning the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine with the Lanham Act, 25 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 53, 54 (2003). 
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Professor Jennifer Rothman argues, “[a]pplication of the initial interest confusion doctrine 
prevents comparative advertisements, limits information available to consumers, and shuts 
down speech critical of trademark holders and their products and services . . . [It] undermines 
the free market system under a misguided notion that competition in and of itself is unfair.”35 
 
B. Acts of Aggression 
 
Encouraged by the expansion of trademark protection in the courts, mark owners have 
become increasingly aggressive in policing their marks. Since “the middle part of the 
twentieth century, courts [have] expanded the range of actionable confusion beyond 
confusion over the actual source of a product—trademark law’s traditional concern—to 
include claims against uses that might confuse consumers about whether the trademark owner 
sponsors or is affiliated with the defendant.”36 Courts are finding liability even when 
consumers “couldn’t possibly have been confused about the actual source of the defendants’ 
products.” 37 
 
The actionable confusion, according to these courts, was not confusion that would 
have led consumers to buy the wrong product, or even to wrongly think they were 
buying from the trademark owner. Rather, the theory in [the examples described by 
Professors Lemley and McKenna] was that consumers would think there was some 
relationship between the trademark owner and the defendant based on the defendant’s 
use of the trademark. The problem with this formulation is that it fails to specify the 
types of relationships about which confusion is relevant or the harm that supposedly 
flows from confusion about those relationships.38 
 
Resellers are often at the mercy of spurious trademark and copyright infringement claims, 
and some courts have ignored affirmative defenses in finding infringement.39 Some courts 
have accepted that confusion with regard to distribution of genuine goods is a valid form of 
trademark infringement, ignoring that there is no confusion as to the source of the goods—
thus eviscerating the first sale affirmative defense. These forms of confusion, however, were 
not envisioned to apply to a competitor’s use of the mark to sell the mark owner’s own 
goods.40 Rather, it “results when a consumer seeks a particular trademark holder’s product 
and instead is lured to the product of a competitor by the competitor’s use of the same or a 
similar mark.”41 
 
  
35 Rothman, supra note 29, at 108, 111 (arguing that “the doctrine is wrong as a matter of policy and . . . it rep-
resents an assault on the fundamental principles of trademark law”). 
36 Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna, Irrelevant Confusion, 62 STAN. L. REV. 413, 414 (2010).  
37 Id. at 416-21. 
 38 Id. at 421-22. 
 39 Grinvald, supra note 19, at 660-61. 
 40 Mary Kay, Inc. v. Weber, No. 3:08–CV–0776–G, 2009 WL 2569070, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 14, 2009). 
 41 Austl. Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1238 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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Thus, in spite of the genuineness of the article sold through resellers, these online resale 
businesses face the prospect of infringement suits due to courts’ broadening interpretation of 
what constitutes actionable confusion. Indeed, since 1958, “the law’s traditional willingness 
to permit a considerable degree of confusion in order to leave room for competitive imitation 
vanished, and courts began to seize on the slightest evidence of confusion as proof of 
infringement.”42 By rejecting a first sale defense based on initial interest confusion—which 
lowers the bar for a finding of a likelihood of confusion and, thus, infringement liability—
“courts have made it very difficult to resell goods online.”43 In essence, the ability to 
successfully claim initial interest confusion based on the distribution channel eviscerates the 
first sale/exhaustion defense for Internet resellers, even when any confusion ends before the 
sale is consummated.44 Such decisions seem contradictory to both congressional intent and 
Supreme Court precedent.  
 
C. Mixing It Up 
 
Mark owners have also sought to indirectly stifle resellers by accusing the resellers’ web 
hosts of infringement through claims of contributory infringement.45 ISPs and online auction 
sites would find it very useful if the Lanham Act had an Internet safe harbor provision similar 
to Section 512 of the Copyright Act.  Under this section, if a rights holder notifies a service 
provider such as eBay that infringing copyrighted material is stored in its system, in order to 
be immune from a suit for monetary damages, the service provider must promptly remove the 
allegedly infringing work. The limitations of copyright rights, however, should, in theory, 
thwart attempts to remove listings of genuine items for resale. However, this copyright 
misuse leaves the mark owners vulnerable to lawsuits under Section 512(f) of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which states that “[a]ny person who knowingly 
materially misrepresents under [Section 512] . . . shall be liable for any damages, including 
costs and attorneys’ fees, incurred by the alleged infringer . . . who is injured by such 
misrepresentation.” 
 
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides copyright owners the exclusive right to reproduce, make 
adaptations, distribute, publicly display, and publicly perform their works. Since 
photographing a three-dimensional copyrighted work results in a reproduction and adaptation 
of that work, photographing a Waterford vase— even for the purpose of using the photograph 
in an advertisement selling the vase— would theoretically infringe on the copyright owner’s 
reproduction and adaptation right, and avail the copyright owner of the Section 512 take-
down provisions.46 There are, however several limitations on these exclusive rights, including 
  
   42 Lunney, supra note 18, at 371, 385.   
 43 Rothman, supra note 29, at 140-45. 
44 See Deborah F. Buckman, Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine Under Lanham Trademark Act, 183 A.L.R. 
Fed. 553, 607-08 (2003). 
45 Cf. John T. Cross, Contributory Infringement and Related Theories of Secondary Liability for Trademark 
Infringement, 80 IOWA L. REV. 101, 101-02 (1994); Elizabeth K. Levin, A Safe Harbor for Trademark: Reevalu-
ating Secondary Trademark Liability After Tiffany v. eBay, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 491, 506 (2009).  
46 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)-(2). 
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Section 113(c), which declares that it is copyright infringement for others to make and 
distribute pictures or photos of a useful article, such as our hypothetical Waterford vase, in 
connection with ads or commentaries related to the distribution or display of such articles, so 
long as the vase has been offered for sale or distributed to the public.  
 
Even so, mark owners persist in bullying resellers to remove photographs of their items from 
websites based on a trademark likelihood of confusion claim, eviscerating the exception 
delineated in Section 113.47 For example, Standard Process separately sued two resellers of 
dietary supplements for trademark infringement, based in part on their use of photographs of 
Standard Process’s products that were being resold online by the defendants.  Standard 
Process sent cease-and-desist letters, stating that use of those photographs violated trademark 
law.48  Yet there was no reason the defendants should have removed the photographs— in 
addition to Section 113, the trademark first sale doctrine includes the ability to “stock, 
display, and resell;” posting photographs of products online amounts to displaying the 
products.49  Their removal, according to Professor Rebecca Tushnet, is “caving to bullying” 
and unwarranted.50  
 
Product photographs can actually help mark owners identify counterfeit products.  So, 
ironically, by creating an environment in which product photographs cause liability, mark 
owners make it even more difficult—for themselves and consumers—to identify counterfeit 
products.51  Of course, a major motive for removing photographs from the reseller’s auction 
listings is that this will hurt sales. eBay even lists as one of its most effective strategies the 
use of “photos from a variety of angles.”52 If mark owners were able to claim that a reseller’s 
use of photographs constitutes trademark infringement, this would be an end run around 
Section 113 of the Copyright Act and eviscerate any protection it affords.  Misusing 
copyright and trademark law points to a single objective: to decrease the competition of 
secondary markets. Small dealers are faced with either defending themselves or ceasing 
operations.53  
  
47 See Rebecca Tushnet, Supplemental Complaint: Internet Resale Case Survives Summary Judgment, 
REBECCA TUSHNET’S 43(B)LOG (June 12, 2008), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2008/06/supplemental-complaint-
internet-resale.html.  
48 Standard Process, Inc. v. Total Health, Disc., Inc., 559 F. Supp. 2d 932, 936 (E.D. Wis. 2008); Standard Pro-
cess, Inc. v. Banks, 554 F. Supp. 2d 866, 868 (E.D. Wisc. 2008).  
49 See Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (em-
phasis added). 
50 Tushnet, supra note 47. 
51 Michelle C. Leu, Comment, Authenticate This: Revamping Secondary Trademark Liability Standards to 
Address A Worldwide Web of Counterfeits, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 591, 616-17 (2011); How to Identify Coun-
terfeit MAC Products: eBay Guides, EBAY (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.ebay.com/gds/How-to-identify-fake-
MAC-Cosmetics-Lipsticks-Viva-Glam-/10000000104967214/g.html. 
52 Take Product Photos that Sell, EBAY (2015), http://pages.ebay.com/sellerinformation/tips-for-selling-
online/effective-ebay-listings/product-photos.html. 
53 See Grinvald, supra note 19, at 647, 650-51. 
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D. Further Pursuits 
 
In addition to attacking resellers, in their aggressive pursuit to shut down the Internet resale 
market, mark owners have also taken their fight to ISPs and online auction sites, alleging 
contributory infringement based on resellers’ use of these sites to advertise the mark owners’ 
goods. In their suits, mark owners allege that auction sites are not doing enough to stop 
counterfeiters; however, the mark owners also have the objective of removing genuine goods 
from this alternative distribution channel.54 For example, in 2002, Tiffany & Co., the well-
known jewelry company, began pressuring eBay to summarily remove Tiffany goods that 
met some general criteria—such as merchants selling more than five items—alleging that 
bulk sales outside Tiffany’s normal distribution chain had to be counterfeit. When eBay 
refused to do so, Tiffany sued, contending that eBay was “facilitating and advertising the sale 
of ‘Tiffany’ goods that turned out to be counterfeit.” 55  
 
eBay was successful in defending both direct and indirect infringement claims based on the 
defenses of nominative fair use and lack of control over the merchants who use the site. The 
Second Circuit declined to find eBay contributorily liable, stating “that eBay’s practice was 
promptly to remove the challenged listing from its website, warn sellers and buyers, cancel 
fees it earned from that listing, and direct buyers not to consummate the sale of the disputed 
item.”56 While the court found that eBay did possess general knowledge that counterfeit items 
were listed on its website, it held that under the Supreme Court test outlined in Inwood 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.,57 generalized knowledge was not sufficient “to 
impose upon eBay an affirmative duty to remedy the problem.”58 Other websites have also 
successfully defended themselves against similar suits.59  
 
In spite of winning in court, these websites want to avoid suits for contributory infringement, 
and will take an unnecessarily strong conservative approach regarding accused listings. The 
hosts want to ensure that they are viewed merely as “conduits” between the buyer and seller 
  
54 See, e.g., Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 98, 101 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010).. 
55 Id. at 101. Tiffany claimed “direct and contributory trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and false 
advertising.” Id. The allegation that bulk sales were counterfeit was rejected by both the district court and on 
appeal. Id. at 109 n.13. 
56 Id. at 103 (agreeing “with the district court that eBay’s use of Tiffany's mark on its website and in sponsored 
links was lawful. eBay used the mark to describe accurately the genuine Tiffany goods offered for sale on its 
website. And none of eBay’s uses of the mark suggested that Tiffany affiliated itself with eBay or endorsed the 
sale of its products through eBay’s website.”).; id. at 106, 109 (holding that eBay was not contributoryily liable 
because it had not continued “to supply its [service] to one whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in 
trademark infringement” (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982)). 
57 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982). 
58 Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 107 (quoting Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), 
aff’d in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010)).  
59 See, e.g., GMA Accessories, Inc. v. BOP, LLC, 765 F. Supp. 2d 457, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)  
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with no direct control over the listed goods,60 and will usually remove listings based on any 
accusation by the mark owner. If it is later proved (by the entity listing the good for sale) that 
it is indeed a genuine good and there is no confusion as to “distribution channel” affiliation, 
the item is relisted. This cycle of removing/disputing/relisting, however, costs the resellers of 
genuine goods time, money, and frustration and creates added burdens to both the reseller and 
the auction site, stifling the sale of goods for both parties. 61 Under the eBay model, every 
time an item is listed, the auction site earns a fee, and another fee is earned when the item is 
sold. Yet when a “take down” occurs, the listing fee is returned to the seller, depriving the 
host of the fee for a legitimate good.62 If the reseller eventually gives up due to the burden of 
constantly having to defend legitimate auction listings to the host, then both the reseller and 
the host lose the income that is generated from the listing and sale of the good.63 
 
A clearly defined and strong trademark first sale doctrine would give auction hosting sites 
less concern over potential lawsuits by mark owners who don’t like their items being sold 
outside their authorized distribution channels.64 
 
 
IV. Getting Defensive 
 
It has been repeatedly acknowledged that the producer of a good cannot prevent others from 
using the good’s mark to truthfully describe the good. This basic belief is the foundation for 
both nominative fair use and first sale defenses, and “reflects the simple insight that anybody 
should be free to refer to goods and services by their brand names.”65 
  
60 See, e.g., Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 98-99; Sellify, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2010 WL 4455830, *4 (Nov. 4, 
2010). 
61 Cf. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 474, 517 (noting that “Tiffany has occasionally been wrong [in alleging that 
an item listed on eBay was counterfeit] and later requested that listings be reinstated”). The Second Circuit not-
ed that, since a substantial number of authentic Tiffany goods are sold on eBay, “[r]educing or eliminating the 
sale of all second-hand Tiffany goods, including genuine Tiffany pieces, through eBay’s website would benefit 
Tiffany in at least one sense: It would diminish the competition in the market for genuine Tiffany merchandise.” 
Tiffany, 600 F.3d at 98; Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d. at 517 n.39. 
62 Standard Selling Fees, EBAY (2015), http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/fees.html; Why Did eBay Remove My 
Listing?, EBAY (2015), http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/questions/listing-ended.html (“If we removed your list-
ing because of a policy violation, we may or may not refund your fees for that listing, depending on the policy 
you violated and whether you’ve violated our policies in the past. If we refund your fees, all fees related to the 
removed listing will be automatically credited to your account within one billing cycle . . . . If we agree that 
your item was removed in error, you can relist it. Unfortunately, you’ll have to recreate the listing from 
scratch.”). 
63 Cf. Tiffany, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 516 (“In addition to removing the [allegedly offending] listing, eBay also 
warned sellers and buyers, cancelled all fees associated with the listing, and directed buyers not to consummate 
the sale of the listed item.”). 
64 “[T]rademark law needs a theory of trademark injury that distinguishes harm to legitimate interests the law 
should protect from a mere desire to capture a benefit enjoyed by another.” Lemley & McKenna, supra note 8, 
at 137. 
65 See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307-08 (9th Cir. 1992); Michael 
Grynberg, Things Are Worse Than We Think: Trademark Defenses in a “Formalist” Age, 24 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 897, 956 (2009). 
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A. Repackaged, Repaired, Resold 
 
There are several ways to use another’s mark in commerce that do not constitute 
infringement. These include, among others, when the vendor is (1) selling repackaged goods; 
(2) selling used or repaired goods; (3) reselling a genuine good.  The repackager does not 
receive absolute protection under the first sale doctrine—the repackaging “can present a non-
trivial harm to the producer’s good will, and can deceive consumers who, in addition to 
identifying the trademark, have come to expect or rely upon a particular type of packaging in 
their purchasing decisions.”66  When a “reseller’s repackaging interferes with the trademark 
owner’s ability to control the quality of its products . . . two harms can arise: harm to the 
consuming public in the form of deception and harm to the trademark owner in the form of 
loss of [good will].”67  Thus, in order to avoid Lanham Act liability, when sellers purchase 
genuine goods and then repackage the goods for resale, these resellers generally must (1) 
disclose that they have repackaged the goods; (2) include their own name; (3) provide notice 
on the package that they are not affiliated with the manufacturer; and (4) must not give 
“undue prominence” to the good’s mark. These rules for repackaged goods illustrate the 
underlying philosophy governing all sellers and resellers—an obligation to tell the truth 
regarding the source of the goods.68  
 
A reseller who is selling a repaired good “has the right to resell the original product with the 
original trademark attached, as long as the reseller tells the truth about the origin of the 
repaired goods and about his responsibility for any repairs.”69 Just as a reseller must state that 
repackaged goods have been repackaged, a reseller of repaired goods must state that they 
have been repaired. At some point, however, repairs may be so extensive that the product 
“cannot properly be considered the same any longer” and the mark no longer truthfully 
describes the goods attached to it. 70 
 
B. Trademark Nominative Fair Use 
 
Supposedly, “[u]se of the mark alone is not sufficiently probative of” an intent to deceive the 
public into believing that the mark owner endorsed or somehow supported the defendant’s 
  
66 Justin D. Swindells, Repackaging Original Trademarked Goods: Trademark Exhaustion or Consumer Con-
fusion?, 7 FED. CIR. B.J. 391, 391-93 (1997). 
67 Id. at 402. 
68 SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 15, at § 31.1.2, 731. In the foundational nominative fair use case of 
Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, the Supreme Court recognized that when a “mark is used in a way that does not de-
ceive the public,” there is “no such sanctity in the word as to prevent its being used to tell the truth.” 
Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924). 
69 David W. Barnes, Free-Riders and Trademark Law’s First Sale Rule, 27 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 457, 486 (2011). 
70 SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 15, at § 31.1.2, 732; see also Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 
U.S. 125, 129 (1947). 
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products or services,71 and a defendant has a right to use a plaintiff’s mark to truthfully 
describe the plaintiff’s goods using the plaintiff’s mark.72  Yet in spite of its twenty-year 
history, the nominative fair use defense has mostly been confined to the Third, Fifth, and 
Ninth Circuits, and is not well understood in any of them.73 Indeed, in the Ninth Circuit, it is 
not an affirmative defense; rather, it replaces likelihood of confusion in the plaintiff’s prima 
facie case.74  The First, Second, and Sixth Circuits have either rejected or declined to adopt 
nominative fair use,75 and other courts have yet to decide on its adoption or rejection.76 In 
spite of this limited acceptance, nominative fair use is mentioned, albeit without a definition, 
in the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006.77 
 
The nominative fair use defense has been criticized for its analytical defects. As noted by 
Professor McGeveran, “[n]ominative fair use as it now exists has become ungainly and often 
unhelpful;”78 he succinctly summarizes the confused and inadequate state of the nominative 
fair use defense: 
 
[C]ourts have gradually larded up the simple idea of nominative fair use presented in 
New Kids to the point where it is excessively complex and minimally useful. By 
moving the doctrine away from any role as an early screening mechanism and closer 
in timing and substance to the likelihood of confusion determination, subsequent 
cases have destroyed nominative fair use.79 
 
  
71 Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. Lendingtree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 227 (3d Cir. 2005). 
72 New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1992). 
73 See Century 21 Real Estate, 425 F.3d at 218. 
74 E.g., Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari, 610 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2010). 
75 Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 102-03 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 647 (2010); Universal 
Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 424 (1st Cir. 2007); PACCAR Inc. v. Telescan Techs., L.L.C., 
319 F.3d 243, 256 (6th Cir. 2003), overruled on other grounds by KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Im-
pression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121-23 (2004). 
76 The Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have to varying degrees declined to affirmatively 
state their position on nominative fair use. See Suntree Techs., Inc. v. EcoSense Int’l, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 2d 
1273, 1282 (M.D. Fla. 2011); Teter v. Glass Onion, Inc., 723 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1156 (W.D. Mo. 2010); Gennie 
Shifter, LLC v. Lokar, Inc., No. 07-cv-01121, 2010 WL 126181, at *14 (D. Colo. Jan. 12, 2010); Lorillard To-
bacco Co. v. S & M Brands, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 2d 581, 589 (E.D. Va. 2009); DeVry Inc. v. Univ. of Med. & 
Health Sci.-St. Kitts, No. 08 CV 3280, 2009 WL 260950, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 3, 2009). 
77 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A) (2006). (“The following shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or dilution 
by tarnishment under this subsection: . . . [a]ny fair use, including nominative . . . fair use, or facilitation of such 
fair use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation of source for the person’s own goods or 
services . . . .”) 
78 McGeveran, supra note 21, at 89. 
79 Id. at 97. 
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This muddled application of nominative fair use has adversely affected online resellers and 
unfairly strengthens mark owners’ control over distribution channels for their goods beyond 
the initial sale to the public.80 
 
C. That First Sale of a Genuine Good 
 
The nominative fair use defense usually concerns comparative advertising or other instances 
where the defendant is selling their own goods and in some way refers to the mark owner’s 
goods.81 Under first sale/exhaustion—which could be considered a variation of nominative 
fair use—the defendant does not use the plaintiff’s mark in an effort to sell her own goods, 
but rather uses the plaintiff’s mark to refer to the plaintiff’s goods, albeit with the intention of 
selling the plaintiff’s goods. The first sale doctrine is based on the principle that trademark 
owners should not be able to control downstream sales of their goods.82 
 
While first sale was legislatively created in the Copyright Act,83 trademark and patent first 
sale (or exhaustion) affirmative defenses are long-recognized judicial constructs.84 All three, 
however, serve a similar purpose: to “narrow[] the rights of the creator of intellectual 
property by creating competition between the creator and the reseller of the work.”85 As 
noted supra, the Supreme Court has recognized as early as 1924 that, even though it results in 
the secondary market merchant getting some advantage from the mark, a mark may be used 
by a refurbisher or reseller of a good in a way that does not deceive the public. Under the 
exhaustion doctrine,  
 
[t]he resale of genuine trademarked goods generally does not constitute infringement. 
This is for the simple reason that consumers are not confused as to the origin of the 
goods: the origin has not changed as a result of the resale . . . . [T]he trademark 
protections of the Lanham Act are exhausted after the trademark owner’s first 
authorized sale of that product. Therefore, even though a subsequent sale is without a 
trademark owner’s consent, the resale of a genuine good does not violate the Act.86 
  
80 Cf. Mary Kay, Inc. v. Weber, 601 F. Supp. 2d 632, 857 (N.D. Tex. 2009(applying the Ninth Circuit test to 
Ms. Weber’s sale of Mary Kay products). 
81 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006) (“[T]he right to use . . . [a] mark shall be subject to proof of infringement . 
. . and shall be subject to the following defenses or defects: . . . [t]hat the use . . . is descriptive of and used fairly 
and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party; Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 725 F.2d 
1240, 1248 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[L]iability for infringement may not be imposed for using a registered trademark in 
connection with truthful comparative advertising.”). 
82 See Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). For an 
in-depth discussion on the first sale rule and its rationale, see Barnes, supra note 70, at 461-69. 
83 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006).  Patent law has a robust, but judicially created exhaustion principle. See Quanta 
Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008).  
84 See, e.g., Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125, 129 (1947); Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 
U.S. 359, 360 (1924). 
85 Barnes, supra note 69, at 461. 
86 Davidoff & Cie, S.A. v. PLD Int’l Corp., 263 F.3d 1297,  1301-02 (citations omitted); Champion Spark Plug, 
331 U.S. at 129; see Prestonettes, 264 U.S. at 360 
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It reflects a general public policy against restraints on alienation.87 “[A]s a general matter, 
trademark law does not reach the sale of genuine goods bearing a true mark even though the 
sale is not authorized by the mark owner.”88  Thus, a reseller has the right to dispose of 
genuine goods that were originally produced under the authority of the mark owner, provided 
that the goods are not materially altered and the reseller does not give the impression it is 
affiliated with the manufacturer.89 Because reselling the manufacturer’s product can lead to 
some confusion as to the connection between the mark owner and the reseller, the first sale 
defense should not be  
 
rendered inapplicable merely because consumers erroneously believe the reseller is 
affiliated with or authorized by the producer. It is the essence of the “first sale” 
doctrine that a purchaser who does no more than stock, display, and resell a 
producer’s product under the producer’s trademark violates no right conferred upon 
the producer by the Lanham Act. When a purchaser resells a trademarked article 
under the producer’s trademark, and nothing more, there is no actionable 
misrepresentation under the statute.90 
 
Courts should tolerate more confusion than they typically do when the defendant is using a 
mark similar to the plaintiff’s to sell the defendant’s own goods.91 As noted by David Barnes, 
courts tend to treat first sale “as an affirmative defense to what would otherwise be an 
infringement of the creator’s rights . . . [and] the trademark defendant has the burden of 
proving that it was reselling genuine and lawfully acquired goods.”92 However, it is the 
plaintiff’s burden under the Lanham Act to establish likelihood of confusion as part of the 
prima facie case. Therefore, if the reason for the alleged likelihood of confusion claim is that 
the goods are not genuine, the plaintiff must prove that.93 Exhaustion should apply equally to 
online sales as it does to brick-and-mortar stores. Courts, however, do not always do so, 
  
87 Barnes, supra note 69, at 458, 462 (“The first sale rule reflects property law’s distaste for restraints on aliena-
tion and allows the holder of intellectual property rights to obtain the price for its creations only once.”). 
88 Bel Canto Design, Ltd. v. MSS HiFi, Inc, 837 F. Supp. 2d 208, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (quoting Zip Int’l Grp., 
LLC v. Trilini Imps., Inc., No. 09-CV-2437(JG)(VVP), 2011 WL 2132980, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 24, 2011)). 
MSS HiFi, however, had altered the goods’ serial number, and the court found that these constituted “altered 
goods” which, as noted supra, are not genuine articles and “may generate consumer confusion about the source 
and quality of the trademarked product.” Id. at 223 (citing Beltronics USA, 562 F.3d 1067, 1072 (Apr. 9, 2009)). 
89 See Champion Spark Plug Co., 331 U.S. at 129 (“[W]e would not suppose that one could be enjoined from 
selling a car whose valves had been reground and whose piston rings had been replaced unless he removed the 
name Ford or Chevrolet.”).   
90 Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). 
91  Id. (applying the first sale doctrine despite consumer confusion). 
92 Barnes, supra note 69, at 465. 
93 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121 (2004); Barnes, supra note 69, 
at 466-67. 
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and—as discussed below—by supporting plaintiffs’ claims of trademark infringement, they 
extend control over the distribution channels of goods beyond the initial sale.94  
 
 
V. Challenging the Mark Owner’s Desire for Total Control 
 
There is a need for comprehensive and definitive trademark nominative fair use and first sale 
doctrines with regard to online resale of genuine goods, along with more leeway regarding 
initial interest confusion related to distribution affiliation. Our solutions are supported by 
recent trademark scholarship advocating the need for a showing of actual injury, rather than 
“merely a benefit to someone else.”95 
 
A. Strengthening Available Defenses 
 
There is a need for a rebalancing of the scales to prevent continued control by mark owners 
of the distribution of their products beyond the first sale. However, “[a]bsent congressional 
action, courts have only a limited ability to correct the imbalance between trademark liability 
and defenses.”96 For a legislative solution that would protect resellers of genuine goods 
without affecting a mark owner’s ability to remove counterfeit goods from the marketplace, 
Congress could amend the Lanham Act by (1) codifying trademark first sale and nominative 
fair use as defenses under Section 33(b); (2) eliminating the controversial claim of initial 
interest confusion regarding the sale of genuine goods; and (3) specifying a requirement of 
deceptive intent regarding distribution affiliation confusion for it to be an actionable claim.97 
This would generate uniformity among the circuits regarding nominative fair use, initial 
interest confusion, and the robustness of the first sale doctrine with regard to trademarks. 
Professor Michael Grynberg notes that when Congress passed the Trademark Anti-Dilution 
  
94 See, e.g., Austl. Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1240-41 (10th Cir. 2006) (regarding a website); Sebas-
tian Int’l, Inc., 53 F.3d at 1076 (regarding a pharmacy); Lemley & McKenna, supra note 8, at 152-53. 
95 See Goldman, supra note 7, at 587; Lemley & McKenna, supra note 37, at 448-49; supra Part I.C; Lemley & 
McKenna, supra note 8, at 188. Professors Lemley and McKenna provide a two part test: 
 
[T]rademark plaintiffs should have to demonstrate (1) that their injury flows from confusion about the 
actual source of the defendant’s goods or about who is responsible for the quality of those goods, or (2) 
that the defendant’s use causes confusion about some other relationship that is material to consumer 
purchasing decisions. 
 
Id. 
96 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644, 650 (6th Cir.) (Griffin, J., dissenting) (stating that courts 
tend to “legislate from the bench” only to implement what they believe is the intent of Congress), vacated, No. 
07-5040, 2008 WL 6191996 (6th Cir. July 28, 2008); Grynberg, supra note 65, at 970. 
97 Cf. Lemley & McKenna, supra note 37, at 450 (“[T]he law should require that trademark owners claiming 
infringement based on confusion regarding anything other than source or responsibility for quality must demon-
strate the materiality of that confusion to consumer purchasing decisions.”); see also S&L Vitamins, Inc. v. 
Austl. Gold, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 188, 202 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Although the first sale doctrine traditionally ap-
plies as a defense to copyright infringement claims, courts have recognized it as a restraint on trademark in-
fringement claims as well.”). 
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Act, it “enact[ed] specific safe harbors for activities that are unlikely to cause confusion or 
those that may cause confusion, but whose social utility is high enough that the benefits of 
immunizing the acts outweigh any costs.”98 
 
Since the trademark exhaustion doctrine has its roots in copyright law; an amendment to the 
Lanham Act could mimic Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act: “Notwithstanding the 
provisions of section 106(3) [the owner’s exclusive right of distribution], the owner of a 
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled, without the 
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or 
phonorecord.” Similar language would provide uniformity across these two often-times 
related intellectual property claims. If Lanham Act language clearly stated that the same first 
sale exception that applies for copyrights also applies for the use of the mark attached to the 
goods, this would give resellers more certainty in their use of the mark owner’s brand when 
identifying the mark owner’s goods during resale.  
 
This solution should lead to less litigation; however, it may not stop the reality of cease-and-
desist letters and threatened litigation. Penalties for threats of frivolous litigation are 
common, and are part of anti-trust law, first amendment protection, and copyright law.99 
Similarly worded language in the Lanham Act may prevent some of this bullying with regard 
to frivolous litigation.100 
 
B. Expect Some Confusion 
 
As noted supra, courts should move back towards their “traditional willingness to permit a 
considerable degree of confusion in order to leave room” for competition.  Professor Glynn 
Lunney argues that, “we must limit actionable confusion to cases where, if the use is allowed 
to continue, a substantial number of purchasers or prospective purchasers will actually 
become confused concerning information that will materially influence their buying 
decisions.”101 Unless the mark owner can show actual deception on the part of the reseller, as 
a general rule plaintiffs should not be allowed to claim initial interest confusion with regard 
to alternative distribution channels of genuine goods. First, as long as there is no deception on 
the part of the reseller, any confusion as to “distribution channel” affiliation ends prior to the 
sale of the good.102 Second, as noted earlier, many consumers visit sites like eBay and 
  
98 Grynberg, supra note 65, at 962. 
99 See, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a)(1), 15a(1), 15c(a)(2)(A) (2006); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 425.16(a), (b)(1), (c)(1) 
(West 2012); 17 U.S.C. § 512(f) (2006).  
100 Though it would do little to prevent the sending of threatening cease-and-desist letters, this matter is a prob-
lem faced by copyright and patent defendants as well and not an issue that will be discussed in this Article. See 
Marketa Trimble, Setting Foot on Enemy Ground: Cease-and-Desist Letters, DMCA Notifications and Personal 
Jurisdiction in Declaratory Judgment Actions, 50 IDEA 777, 786-87 (2010). 
101 Lunney, supra note 18, at 478. 
102 Strange Music, Inc. v. Strange Music, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d 481, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Lemley & McKen-
na, supra note 37, at 448 (proposing that sponsorship or affiliation confusion should only be actionable if “they 
(1) are false or misleading and (2) materially affect consumer decisions”). 
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Craigslist for the purpose of finding genuine goods at lower costs than they would expect to 
find when buying directly from the mark owner or an authorized retailer.103  Indeed, when a 
product is subject to first sale doctrine and the nominative fair use that accompanies it, some 
confusion should be expected. The Supreme Court declared in KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. 
v. Lasting Impressions I, Inc. that, “[s]ince the burden of proving likelihood of confusion 
rests with the plaintiff, and the fair use defendant has no free-standing need to show 
confusion unlikely, it follows . . . that some possibility of consumer confusion must be 
compatible with fair use, and so it is.”104  
 
Any initial confusion to the resale of a genuine good is related to the distribution source, not 
to the good itself; a claim of initial interest confusion should be a spurious allegation. An 
assertion of confusion as to the distributor’s affiliation should be discounted—after all, there 
is no confusion as to the source of the good; the mark owner is truthfully the source of the 
good. And to hold a defendant liable for infringement where there may only be initial 
confusion as to whether the distribution channel is associated with the mark owner results in 
the mark owner controlling subsequent sales of his or her product.105  
 
Although courts have declared that “[a]ffiliation confusion exists where use of a ‘unique and 
recognizable identifier’ could lead consumers to ‘infer a relationship’ between the trademark 
owner and the new product[,]”106 this should not apply to the distribution of the goods after 
the initial sale, but rather only to the good itself. Otherwise, a finding of initial interest 
affiliation confusion because the seller is not affiliated with the mark owner would eviscerate 
any protection afforded through trademark law’s first sale/exhaustion principle.107 
 
We also should question whether initial interest affiliation confusion matters at all with 
regard to the secondary sale of goods. Courts have found such a claim spurious. In her 
concurrence in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., Judge Marsha 
Berzon contended that it was not “reasonable to find initial interest confusion when a 
consumer is never confused as to source or affiliation, but instead knows, or should know, 
from the outset that a product or web link is not related to that of the trademark holder 
because the list produced by the search engine so informs him.”108 Yet this form of confusion 
has been successfully asserted in Internet resale cases. Juries and judges have supported a 
finding of infringement based on initial interest affiliation confusion as to the distribution 
channel of the good, and have often discounted any first sale or nominative fair use 
  
103 See Goldman, supra note 7, at 522-24 (discussing how search users can have a variety of reasons for the use 
of trademark search terms, including finding distribution sources other than those authorized by the mark own-
er). 
104 KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121-22 (2004). 
105 See Grynberg, supra note 65, at 907-08. 
106 De Beers LV Trademark Ltd. v. DeBeers Diamond Syndicate, Inc. 440 F. Supp. 2d 249, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (quoting Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 412 F.3d 373, 384 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
107 Rothman, supra note 29, at 140. 
108 Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1034-35 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., 
concurring). 
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defense.109 Judges and juries seem to hold Internet sales to a different standard than 
consignment and resale shops in the brick-and-mortar world, where a plaintiff would face a 
much higher hurdle to show customer confusion with regard to distribution affiliation.110 
 
There should be a presumption of non-infringement when a product’s brand is used in the 
advertising for the reselling of an item—including in the description of it or use of a 
photograph of the item in an online sale.  The plaintiff would have to overcome this 
presumption as part of his or her prima facie case.111  Without a proven deception by the 
reseller, confusion as to affiliation with regard to distribution channels should be negated by 
the fact that the goods in question are genuine goods, and there is no confusion as to the 
actual source of the goods. “The words of the Lanham Act should not be stretched to cover 
matters that are typically of no consequence to purchasers.”112 As long as the goods are 
genuine, we must even question whether the purchaser is initially confused regarding the 
reseller’s lack of affiliation with the mark owner.113 The “point is not that consumers can 
never be harmed by confusion regarding non-quality-related relationships. Rather, the point is 
that the sort of attenuated confusion at issue in sponsorship and affiliation cases does not 
necessarily or even often harm consumers or the market for quality products[,]” and the costs 
of protecting consumers from this form of confusion is unreasonably high.114 “In delineating 
the boundary between fair and unfair competition, we must keep firmly in mind that if 
competition is to remain an effective force for promoting social welfare, we must leave room 
for would-be competitors to operate.”115  
 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Protecting the resale market increases consumer choice and spurs mark owners to innovate 
and bring new and improved products to the market. Legislatively-created first sale and 
nominative fair use doctrines, along with the elimination of initial interest confusion as a 
cause of action under the Lanham Act, would provide resellers and auction websites guidance 
in navigating the minefield of rights and duties with regard to Internet secondary-market 
sales, so that they more closely resemble the brick-and-mortar setting. This would support the 
economic policy goals underlying intellectual property116 and spur competition and 
  
109 See Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999) (ig-
noring the distribution channel); Mary Kay, Inc. v. Weber, 601 F. Supp. 2d 839, 858-59 (N.D. Tex. 2009) (ig-
noring first sale and fair use). 
110 See Rothman, supra note 29, at 169-70. 
111 McCann v. Newman Irrevocable Trust, 458 F.3d 281, 287 (3d Cir. 2006). 
112 Daystar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 32-33 (2003). 
113 See Sharrock, supra note 34, at 65-66. 
114 Lemley & McKenna, supra note 37, at 437-38 (emphasis omitted); id. at 438-42. 
115 Lunney, supra note 18, at 486. 
116 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1932)  
 
 UNEDITED VERSION FOR INSTITUTIONAL REPOSITORY 
19 
 
innovation in the marketplace.117 These solutions would also benefit consumers looking for 
bargains and align trademark exhaustion in cyberspace with its application with brick-and-
mortar settings.118 
 
“The rights of a patentee or copyright holder are part of a ‘carefully crafted bargain,’ under 
which, once the patent or copyright monopoly has expired, the public may use the invention 
or work at will and without attribution.” And both courts and Congress are loath to extend 
through trademark that which has been lost through the expiration of a patent or copyright.119  
For the first sale/exhaustion doctrine to be meaningful in copyright and patent law contexts, it 
must be equally robust as a trademark infringement defense. Nominative fair use must 
actually be accepted by the courts. In “brick-and-mortar” settings, there is no confusion as to 
affiliation with the mark owner with regard to distribution channels—it would be difficult to 
believe that a consumer would think that a consignment shop or antique store was affiliated 
with the mark owners of all the goods sold at such venues. The same should hold equally true 
in cyberspace. 
 
  
(The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the 
general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors. A copyright, like a patent, is ‘at 
once the equivalent given by the public for benefits bestowed by the genius and meditations and 
skill of individuals, and the incentive to further efforts for the same important objects.’ (quoting 
Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 328 (1858))). 
117 See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 8, at 185. 
118 See generally Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1076 (9th Cir. 1995) (per 
curiam). 
119 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 33-34 (2003) (citation omitted); see Sebas-
tian Int’l, Inc., 53 F.3d at 1075. 
